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ABSTRACT
Do religious donors give strategically or idealistically? The entanglement between the conservative Republi-
can party and religious groups, particularly evangelical Christianity, on issues of abortion, sexual mores, and 
family values makes it difficult to analyze this question along voting lines. Regardless of how one votes, cit-
izens and organizations can still punish their political leaders for moral infractions by voting with their wal-
lets. This study aims to discern if there is a relationship between political scandals and religious donations.
The Conscience of the Dollar: Are Religious Donors 
Sensitive to Moral Infractions?
By Bradley Yam1
1Program in Ethics, Politics and Economics, Yale University; Department of Computer 
Science, Yale University
INTRODUCTION
The intersection between evangelicalism and conservatism in 
America inconveniently termed as “the Christian Right” has had 
to undergo some soul searching amid the controversial years of 
the Trump presidency (Putnam, Campbell, & Garrett, 2010). Ac-
cording to Doug Pagitt, the executive director of the Christian 
campaign organization, “Vote Common Good,” evangelical vot-
ers are increasingly on the fence about supporting a president 
who appears to lack “kindness and decency” (Sherwood, 2020). 
However, if religious individuals have legitimate strategic rea-
sons to support the Republican party, such as the seriousness 
of abortion, then policy positions might outweigh qualms over 
the moral character of individual politicians. In fact, this posi-
tioning may even make moral infractions committed by office 
holders seem irrelevant.
This paper addresses the significance of moral infractions for re-
ligious support and, in particular, for religious donations. Reli-
gious donations are chosen as an outcome variable because, un-
like votes, donations are continuous instead of discrete and are 
a more demanding political activity with direct financial costs. 
Therefore, religious donations may be more sensitive to moral 
infractions, or put another way, religious donations may be more 
elastic to moral infractions, revealing how religious individuals 
react to moral qualms in a way that voting cannot.
I begin by examining the existing literature on religious motiva-
tions for political donations. Then, I describe the specific ques-
tion this paper attempts to answer and establish several scope 
conditions, as well as the proposed methodology for answering 
those questions. Following which, I demonstrate through statis-
tical evidence from several Congressional races that, surprising-
ly, moral infractions do not significantly depress political dona-
tions from religious individuals. In fact, in most cases, strategic 
considerations seem to dominate religious donors. I show these 
effects by breaking down the observed data into cases. Subse-
quently, I analyze how this trend has interacted with other trends 
such as the #MeToo movement and increasing partisanship.
The implications of such a study have immediate political sig-
nificance. In a two-party system in the US, it can be difficult 
to measure support. People can vote strategically for the less-
er of two evils even when their personal views are misaligned. 
Donations act as a signal of whether politicians are gaining or 
losing ground in their respective races. If religious donors real-
ly are sensitive to moral infractions, then politicians must also 
pay attention to their personal conduct when running for office. 
This may be especially salient as the sums of money raised for 
various elections have grown exponentially over the past several 
election cycles.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Religiosity has been shown to be a strong predictor of political 
attitudes (Cohen-Zada, Margalit, & Rigbi, 2016), and there is 
some evidence of causality (Hungerman et al, 2018). Studies 
have also shown that political campaign stops can affect reli-
gious donations (Hungerman et al, 2018). Jones-Correa and Leal 
(2001) suggest that religious participation trains civic skills that 
drive political participation.
Studies have also shown that moral infractions by religious 
leaders have led to a direct decrease in religious donations to re-
ligious organizations (Hungerman, 2013). It is not too far off to 
speculate that moral infractions by political leaders might lead 
to decreases in political donations amongst religious individuals 
(Bottan, 2015). Hungerman (2013), in a similar study, lends sup-
port to the religious marketplace hypothesis by demonstrating 
that declines in Catholic donations can lead to upticks in dona-
tions to other non-Catholic organizations. The religious market 
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model suggests that churches as institutions can strategically 
engage in politics when it suits their interest in retaining mem-
bers. However, does the same kind of strategic thinking apply to 
members themselves? Such models imply that strategic interests 
trump ideological principles when religion interacts with polit-
ical processes.
In the literature, political contributions can be analyzed as mon-
etary surrogacy, where individual donors are able to use their 
financial resources to expand their political influence beyond 
the numerical and geographical limitations of their vote (Gim-
pel, Lee, & Pearson-Merkowitz, 2008). Gimpel, Lee and Pear-
son-Merkowitz (2008) show that a majority of campaign contri-
butions come from nonresidents and that these contributions are 
mostly driven by strategic partisan interests. They also demon-
strate the effect of access-seeking and expressive/identity pur-
poses, but these effects remain small in comparison to strategic 
interests. This result is strengthened by Ovtchinnikov and Panta-
leoni (2012), who show that campaign contributions can also be 
driven by strong economic interests by demonstrating an effect 
of economically dependent geographies on relevant political 
contributions. While expressive/identity interests come closest 
to an analysis on religious donors, these studies largely omit 
religiosity as a factor. This paper seeks to analyze whether flows 
of money are predominantly strategic, or if religious and moral 
considerations can serve as an effective moderating factor.
Despite the fact that religious voting is associated with the Re-
publican party, statistics from opensecrets.org reveal that the 
majority (62%) of donations in 2014 have gone to support Dem-
ocrats. However, the total amount donated by individuals with 
religious associations are rather small, totaling only 1.6 million 
US dollars. Given that the largest institutional donor is the Unit-
ed Methodist Church at roughly $400,000, and they overwhelm-
ingly donate to the Democratic party, it seems like, contrary to 
popular belief, the religious left is more politicized than the re-
ligious right (CRP, 2020).
METHODOLOGY
In order to determine if religious donors are sensitive to moral 
infractions, which can be characterized as an exogenous shock, 
this paper examines if donations changed after a publicly ob-
servable moral infraction, as compared to donations before the 
infraction in the same race. I use a regression discontinuity ap-
proach, where religious ZIP codes above a certain threshold are 
used to identify “religious donors.” A simple difference-in-dif-
ference approach was chosen to compare the effect of moral 
infractions on religious donors. The alleged misconduct func-
tioned effectively as a treatment in this analysis.
The difference-in-difference analysis was implemented with a 
simple OLS regression. In order to control for fixed time effects, 
such as increased donations closer to the election, dummy vari-
ables were also added for each month in the election cycle.
Two sets of controls were used. The first set of controls were 
synthetic controls created by aggregating contributions in the 
same 2018 congressional election but from matched congres-
sional candidates. More detail about the matching method is 
provided later, but notable studies in comparative politics from 
Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmuller (2015) have demonstrated 
the usefulness of synthetic controls in studies with relatively 
small sample sizes that combine quantitative and qualitative 
data. This approach tested if religious donors were sensitive to 
moral infractions, and in what direction. The second set of con-
trols were the (relatively) non-religious donors in the same race. 
These non-religious donors were exposed to the same moral in-
fraction as their religious counterparts. This approach tested if 
religious donors were comparably more sensitive to moral in-
fractions than their non-religious counterparts after being ex-
posed to the same treatment.
All the code and data for this project, with the exception of the 
opensecrets.org data, which can be found on opensecrets.org, 
are available on this public git repository: https://github.com/ 
bradleyyam/notty-heads.
DATA
In order to build a dataset of donations before and after a moral 
infraction, publicly available misconduct data from the House 
Ethics Committee was obtained through govtrack.us (Govtrack, 
2020). Publicly available campaign contribution data was ob-
tained from opensecrets.org (CRP, 2020). Publicly available 
data on religious adherence was obtained from the “2010 U.S. 
Religion Census: Religious Congregations and Membership 
Study, 2010 (County File)” (ASARB, 2010), along with other 
datasets that helped us match candidate ids between datasets and 
map ZIP codes to county FIPS codes (Govtrack, 2017; niccolley, 
2017).
The resulting data had the following dimensions:
1. Campaign Contribution Data: 26,059,493 observa-
tions. These contributions were dated from 1 Jan 2017 
to 31 Dec 2018 and focused on the 2018 Congressio-
nal Races. The data included: Receiver ID, Date, Con-
tributor Industry, Contributor ZIP Code, Contributor 
Gender, Contributor Occupation, Amount. All obser-
vations are individual contributions.
2. Misconduct Data: 23 observations. These observa-
tions were dated from 1 Jan 2017 to 31 Dec 2018. 
They included the first date of the allegation and the 
details of the allegation, as well as the name and ID 
of the candidate.
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3. Religiosity Data: 3149 observations. Each observa-
tion represents a unique county. The data includes in-
formation on the population of each county, and the 
rates of adherence of a particular denomination in 
each county.
4. Legislator Data: Maps unique ids for each legislator 
between opensecrets.org data and govtrack.us data.
5. ZIP Code Data: Maps each ZIP code to their respec-
tive County FIP code.
DATA WRANGLING
Campaign contribution and misconduct data were combined to 
generate 10 discrete time-series datasets that each represented 
one congressional race. Of the 23 misconduct instances that 
were selected, only 10 fulfilled the following criteria:
1. At least 30 observations in each race of campaign do-
nations before the alleged misconduct and after.
2. Misconduct happened before the elections and after 
the last cycle of elections.
An interesting outcome of this initial exclusion is that most sex-
ual misconduct cases were dropped from the analysis. This in-
cludes the cases concerning candidates Elizabeth Etsy, Patrick 
Meehan, Trent Franks, Al Franken, John Conyers, Jr, Filner, and 
Weiner. There is insufficient data after the first date of the allega-
tion because a majority of these cases ended in their resignation.
Subsequently, another culling was performed based on the avail-
ability of data once filters were applied to narrow the analysis 
to the religious donors in each race. In addition, each race also 
needed a matched control with sufficient data.
Only a few congressional races that fulfill the criteria above re-
main: Devin Nunes, Raul Grijalva, Robert Menendez and Rod 
Blum.
IDENTIFICATION
Since religiosity of each donor cannot be directly measured, two 
proxies were used to create a binary variable. First, the Realcode 
of the donation was interpreted such that any donations coming 
from religious Realcodes were classified as religious. Second, 
counties with religious adherence rate in the upper quartile of 
the overall religious distribution were classified as religious, and 
donations coming from ZIP codes that were mapped to those 
counties were also classified as religious. I focused explicitly on 
the largest three denominations of Christianity in the US: Main-
line Protestants, Evangelical Protestants, and Catholics. This 
focus captures a broad definition of religiosity, while noting the 
significant role that Christianity, in particular, plays in US poli-
tics (Putnam et al., 2010).
Although this is not a foolproof estimator of religiosity, giv-
en that this analysis is only looking for an effect across time, 
and intuitively religious communities might tend to be more ho-
mogenous, I argue that this is a reasonable estimation to make. 
Since America has a long tradition of religiosity stretching back 
to the founding fathers and has long been considered a “Chris-
tian nation,” this identification estimation is less about trying 
to distinguish religious from irreligious people, but more about 
distinguishing the relatively more religious from the relatively 
less religious. As such, this study effectively uses “religious” 
as a shorthand for referring to “people who live in relatively 
religious regions.” The same measure of religiosity was used to 
filter the observations in the control group as in the treatment 
group.
CONTROL GROUPS
In order to discover a control group, the time-series sum of do-
nations per month for each misbehaving candidate were matched 
across the entire population of 2767 other congressional can-
didates receiving campaign contributions for the 2018 election 
using a statistical correlation test. This high number of available 
matches means that more complicated methods like propensity 
score matching were relatively intractable. Moreover, by iso-
lating the pre-treatment time series as a primary variable for 
matching, I ensured that the most important variable, contribu-
tions, were matched. At least 2 controls were matched and com-
bined to make a synthetic control, thus reducing the possibility 
of statistical artifacts by averaging across multiple races.
The following criteria were used to select candidates for syn-
thetic controls:
1. Pearson’s correlation score of 0.8 or higher for 
pre-treatment contribution trends, sum of contribu-
tions aggregated in each month.
2. Same party
3. Same geographical region (Midwest, Northeast, etc.)
Rather than using a weighted average similar to Abadie’s syn-
thetic controls (Abadie et al., 2015), contributions were simply 
aggregated together. This simplification in method preserved 
the actual value of each individual contribution, which matters 
when analyzing the effect of the treatment. Moreover, since the 
absolute amount of campaign contributions generally differs ac-
cording to a variety of factors, this analysis was not concerned 
about matching on the absolute amount, but matching the pat-
tern of change in the amount using the diff-in-diff approach. 
Hence, a weighted average is not necessarily a better approach.
Regressions were also conducted on non-religious donors vis-à-
vis religious donors regarding individuals with alleged miscon-
duct within the same congressional race. Since the religious and 
non-religious groups both underwent the treatment, this method 
allowed me to investigate whether religious donors were more 
sensitive to the moral infraction than their less religious coun-
terparts.
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Table 2. Diff-in-Diff Frequency of Contributions (Religious Subset with 
Matched Controls)
Table 3. Diff-in-Diff Sum Contributions Over Each Month (Religious 
Subset with Matched Controls)
Table 4. Diff-in-Diff Using Non-Religious Donors as Comparison Group 
for Individual Contributions 
Table 5. Diff-in-Diff Using Non-Religious Donors as Comparison Group 
for Frequency
Table 6. Diff-in-Diff Using Non-Religious Donors as Comparison Group 
for Sum Contributions
Table 1. Diff-in-Diff Individual Dollar Amount (Religious Subset )with 
Matched Controls)
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FINDINGS
The results surprisingly demonstrate that if there is any statis-
tically significant relationship between moral infractions and 
campaign contributions, it is likely to be positive. That is, re-
ligious contributions tend to go up for candidates who commit 
moral infractions, but not in every case. For two candidates, 
Raul Grijava (Table 1, p=.183, R2=.0090; Table 4,  p=.0558, 
R2=.2513) and Devin Nunes (Table 1, p=.0398, R2=.0970; Table 
4,  p=.7140, R2=.0741), the effect was not statistically signifi-
cant. However, for Rod Blum (Table 1, p=.0032, R2=.0999; Ta-
ble 4,  p=2.19e-12, R2=.2048) and Robert Menendez (Table 1, 
p=2.02e-06, R2=.0686; Table 4,  p=.3.47e-06, R2=.0863), it was 
significant and positive.
Even if it is unclear how the dollar amount of individual con-
tributions fluctuates, there seems to be a compensatory effect in 
most cases, where the frequency of contributions increases in 
the same period, so that the net effect on the total sum received 
by contributors tends to be higher overall (Table 3: p=[.0092, 
.0403, .0344, .1770] R2=[.73, .4931, .4591, .4528] and Table 6: 
p=[.9489, .4796, .0325, . 0032] R2=[.1237, .09101, .531, .415]). 
Although it is the case that the frequency of contributions tends 
to increase for competitive congressional races closer to the 
election date in November 2018, the increase in the frequency of 
contributions was still statistically significant from the baseline 
controls (Table 5: p=[.5591, .0023, .0138, .0052] R2=[.0303, 
.4551, .4963, .476]).
While Rod Blum experienced a strong reduction in the dollar 
amount of his contributions, he also saw more contributions af-
ter his alleged misconduct, leading to a statistically insignificant 
change in his total contributions. Raul Grijava appeared to have 
no significant change in any of the metrics. Devin Nunes and 
Robert Menendez both saw a statistically significant increase 
in the frequency of contributions after the alleged misconduct. 
Robert Menendez also saw an increase in the dollar amount of 
individual contributions which netted a statistically significant 
increase in the sum of contributions per month after the alleged 
misconduct.
These findings are made more puzzling by the fact that when re-
ligious donors are compared to non-religious donors in the same 
congressional race with alleged misconduct, religious donors 
seem to contribute less than their non-religious counterparts af-
ter the misconduct (Figure 1). I will argue later that this is a sta-
tistical artifact, but it is an important one that informs us about 
the contribution patterns of religious donors.
ANALYSIS
These results are surprising. Rather than showing a decrease in 
support for congressmen with alleged misconduct, they show an 
unclear dollar amount of individual contributions and at least 
some positive effect on the frequency of contributions post-mis-
conduct.
It is important to look at all three outcome variables, namely, 
Figure 1. Sum Contributions of Religious Donors (Blue) vs. Non-Reli-
gious Donors (Black)
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individual contributions, the frequency of contributions, and the 
sum of contributions, over each week to get an accurate picture 
of what is happening. For instance, an increase in sum of contri-
butions and individual contributions but a decrease in frequency 
of contributions amongst religious donors can be interpreted as 
donors who are both religious and strategic doubling down on 
their partisan interests while other religious donors withdraw 
their contributions entirely.
Before diving into the analysis of the respective races, it is worth 
addressing the broader pattern of how religious donors tend to 
donate. In examining the graphs below that compare non-reli-
gious donors (classified as 0) and religious donors (classified as 
1), given that most of the misconduct instances happen just be-
fore this surge, one might be misled into thinking that contribu-
tions from religious donors were depressed by the misconduct. 
However, my analysis with the appropriate controls informs us 
that this is not the case. Rather, religious donors are simply more 
consistent and are not as sensitive to the time fixed effects that 
produce a surge of donations right before the election.
This pattern is clearly reflected in Figure 1, where one can see 
that non-religious contributions are more sensitive to the tim-
ing of the election in November than are religious contributions. 
However, Figure 2 demonstrates that in comparison to the syn-
thetic controls, religious donors tend to donate more after a mor-
al infraction.
Additionally, note that I am not able to study most instances of 
sexual misconduct, at least in the 2018 races. This is because 
all congressmen accused of sexual misconduct resigned from 
their races. Sexual misconduct in the #MeToo era appears to be 
anathema for any sort of political office.
The following sections will analyze each congressional candi-
date and elaborate on the circumstances surrounding their mis-
conduct and their campaign success.
RAUL GRIJALVA
The case study of Rep. Raul Grijalva of Arizona District 03 al-
lows us to investigate if religious donors are sensitive to de-
bauchery and drunkenness in their political leadership; behav-
ior that is traditionally frowned upon almost as much as sexual 
misconduct. The House Ethics Committee described Grijalva’s 
offense as creating “a hostile work environment and being fre-
quently drunk” (Marcos, 2019). Despite this misconduct, there 
does not seem to be a reduction of support in the dollar amount 
or the frequency of his individual contributions.
This consistent monetary support is in spite of the fact that Rep. 
Grijalva runs in a relatively uncompetitive election. As the in-
cumbent, he has been consistently re-elected since 2002 with 
healthy margins of up to 63% of the vote. In 2016, he ran un-
opposed. In 2018, he raised $697.82K while his opponent only 
raised $77K. This lack of competition should have been an op-
portunity for religious voters to punish his behavior by with-
holding their monetary contributions while still reaping the ben-
Figure 2. Sum Contributions of Treated Religious Donors (Blue) vs. 
Non-Treated Religious Donors (Black)
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efits of his office. However, it appears that religious voters are 
either insensitive to this kind of moral infraction or inattentive 
to the signal by the House Ethics Committee, despite the fact 
that the news was boosted by Interior Secretary Ryan Zinke.
Grijalva is the only member of this list that was accused of 
drunkenness; all the others were accused of corruption or finan-
cial misconduct in one form or another.
ROD BLUM
Rep. Rod Blum is the only member of this list who appears to 
have had a decrease in the dollar amount of individual contribu-
tions from his religious base as a result of his misconduct. How-
ever, as if to compensate for the decrease in the dollar amount of 
each contribution, the frequency of contributions also increased 
post-misconduct.
There are several factors that may have contributed to this pat-
tern. First, Rep. Blum ran in a relatively competitive election. 
In 2018, he raised a hefty $2.31 million, but still fell short of 
his opponent’s $4.59 million. He eventually lost the election. 
Second, Rep. Blum’s financial support base consists of roughly 
70% large individual contributions and Political Action Com-
mittee (PAC) contributions, and only 15% small contributions. 
This means that what we may be observing is a pullback in the 
conspicuous donations from wealthy individuals, who might be 
more sensitive to reputational concerns than non-wealthy indi-
viduals, but a compensatory mobilization amongst the smaller 
contributors in light of the stiff competition that Rep. Blum 
faced.
Additionally, Rep. Rod Blum’s corruption allegation was se-
rious, widely reported, and novel. Blum had failed to disclose 
his role in a company he had formed, an allegation that might 
amount to criminal fraud. This fact was widely covered by both 
local and national news. Moreover, unlike Sen. Robert Menen-
dez who had been battling different iterations of corruption 
charges since 2015, Blum’s charge was new. All the same, it 
appears that rather than punish Blum financially for his actions, 
religious donors chose to double down and donate strategically 
in order to support their political interests.
DEVIN NUNES
Rep. Devin Nunes has been embroiled in many controversies of 
the Trump Administration, the latest of which being the attempt 
to discredit Joe Biden with other allegations over corruption, 
but in 2017 and 2018, he had been involved in the investigations 
into Russia’s influence in the 2016 presidential election. Nunes 
was also a key player in Trump’s transition team.
Nunes’ election in 2018 was a relatively competitive one, and it 
was also very expensive. Nunes raised $12.62 million, while his 
opponent raised $9.09 million. Like Grijalva, Nunes had occu-
pied his seat since 2003 and had run several times unopposed. 
Nunes’ popularity and his donations increased exponentially 
after Donald Trump’s election, and it is evident that his partici-
pation in the Trump Administration earned him many financial 
supporters. Nunes’ involvement in the Trump Administration is 
a confounding factor for any analysis of his campaign contribu-
tions post 2016.
There was a statistically significant increase in the frequency 
of campaign contributions to Nunes post-allegation (Table 1, 
p=.0138, R2=.4963). Given that his support base is roughly 52% 
small contributors, it is likely that his involvement in the Trump 
Administration might have given him the platform to turn the 
allegation into a rallying point for an increase in contributions. 
Otherwise, it could be that the competition surrounding his seat 
also drove more contributions post-allegation. Moreover, this 
allegation was also not the first House Ethics Committee inves-
tigation into Nunes. Previously, the Committee had investigated 
Nunes for releasing confidential information in the Russia in-
vestigation. Like Rep. Menendez, previous investigations could 
have inured the public to the signal of moral infractions.
ROBERT MENENDEZ
Rep. Robert Menendez ran in arguably the most competitive 
election of this list. Although he raised a hefty $12.27 million, 
his opponent raised a staggering $39.16 million. Rep. Menendez 
saw both an increase in the frequency and the dollar amount of 
contributions from religious donors after the misconduct alle-
gation.
However, this allegation was not Rep. Menendez’s first by a 
long shot (Corasaniti, 2017). Corruption charges were initially 
levelled against Rep. Menendez in 2013, resulting in a 2017 trial 
that eventually ended in a deadlocked jury. Menendez’s support 
in the polls had fallen drastically during the trial, with roughly 
50% of Jersey residents thinking that he was unfit for office. The 
allegation arguably only made the 2018 race more competitive.
In sum, the religious voters that came out in support of Menen-
dez post-2017 were already committed to supporting his re-elec-
tion despite the previous charge. Therefore, the new controver-
sy that emerged served only to push Menendez’s supporters to 
double down and increase their support in the face of what they 
perceived to be another political attack.
DISCUSSION
How do we interpret these results? It is tempting to conclude 
that when it comes to politics, religious individuals are just as 
strategic as non-religious ones: voting and donating according 
to what best advances their own interests, regardless of any mor-
al ideals. Certainly, this interpretation would follow along the 
theme in the religious rational choice literature, which indicates 
that religious people can be expected to act rationally (according 
to their self-interest) but with a different set of fundamental as-
sumptions about the world (Scheve & Stasavage, n.d.). 
However, I suggest that the jury is still out. The misconduct data 
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issued by the House Ethics Committee presents a good but in-
complete view of misbehavior among Congress. Moreover, the 
four races that I analyzed are a very small sample of the universe 
of possible moral infractions to investigate. It could be that re-
ligious donors are reacting to signals beyond what the House 
Ethics Committee publishes. For example, Robert Menendez’s 
support could have come from a sense of injustice at his ex-
oneration in 2017 but subsequent retrial in 2018. It might also 
be that religious donors simply weigh the moral effects of their 
political contributions more than the moral character of their 
political leaders, leading them to donate strategically (Putnam 
et al., 2010). Additionally, Raul Grijalva’s case could also imply 
that religious donors are simply inattentive. More broad-based 
analyses that consider different measures of moral infractions 
and more detailed analyses that look into the exact sentiment 
of the religious base are necessary before any final conclusions 
can be drawn.
The conclusions that can be drawn from the data are that re-
ligious donors are in general more consistent donors as com-
pared to their non-religious counterparts. This consistency could 
be due to the practice of alms-giving or regular religious do-
nations that shape their practice of political contributions. To-
gether with the observation that news about moral infractions 
might not cause religious donors to entirely drop the support 
of their candidate, this has implications in particular on cam-
paign ad-spending. Further research could examine if campaign 
ad-spending for political contributions has a better return on in-
vestment in religious areas as opposed to non-religious areas. 
This study also implies that political ads that aim to smear their 
opponents may not be effective in reducing contributions for 
their opponents. One hopes that this is true, as less smear adver-
tising is surely better for modern politics.
CONCLUSION
The initial hypothesis going into this study was that, given the 
opportunity, religious donors would punish moral infractions 
of their political leaders through reducing donations. Howev-
er, it must be concluded that this is surprisingly not the case. 
With the exception of sexual misconduct, which seems to be 
universally condemnable, other moral infractions appear to not 
have an effect on decreasing financial support. Not only is there 
insufficient evidence for a decrease in support, but it appears 
that religious donors actually double down and increase their 
donations in races that are especially competitive when there is 
an alleged misconduct. The diverse sample of Republican and 
Democratic politicians demonstrate that this holds true across 
party lines. It appears that the extent of media coverage and the 
existence of previous allegations are also possible factors at play 
here. Whether the alleged misconduct is interpreted as an unfor-
tunate blemish on an otherwise suitable candidate, or as a politi-
cal smear by the opposing party, religious donors appear to only 
be sensitive to moral infractions when allegations might harm 
the prospects of their preferred candidate winning the election.
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